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# **Business intelligence (BI)** and **data analytics** have been an ever-growing trend in



### **DATA WAREHOUSE**

### Business



### Non-business

















#### Introduction

- Data warehouse
- Cloud computing



### **Problems**

- Cloud data warehouse



multi secret sharing



Scheme II - Sharing a data warehouse in the cloud



Security analysis & performance evaluation



**Conclusions** 

- Conclusions - Future researches













### **CLOUD DATA WAREHOUSE**



eric





### **Scheme-I:** A new (*m*, *n*, *t*) multi secret sharing scheme



### **Scheme-I:** A new (*m*, *n*, *t*) multi secret sharing scheme





#### **Sharing Process**

- 1 Data are organized into blocks.
- 2 Create a signature in each block.
- 3 Encrypt data and a signature in each block by Polynomial equation.
- Create a signature of each encrypted data.

### **Scheme-I:** A new (*m*, *n*, *t*) multi secret sharing scheme





#### **Reconstructing Process**

- 1 Select t CSPs from n CSPs
- 2 Verify a correctness of encrypted data in each CSP.
- **3** Transfer encrypted data to user.
- 4 Compute original data and a signature.
- **5** Verify the correctness of data.

### **Scheme-I:** A new (*m*, *n*, *t*) multi secret sharing scheme



**Scheme-II: Sharing a data warehouse in the cloud** 







### **Data Analysis over shares**

Can analyze data (search and aggregation operations) over shares while not decrypting all data first.

Original data				
id	name	salary	sex	
124	Bob	75€	М	
125	Anna	80€	F	

Encrypted data at CSP <sub>1</sub>					
id	name	salary	sex		
124	(0,0),(10,3),(11,4)	(3,3)	(9,2)		
125	(6,6),(10,3),(10,3),(0,0)	(0,0)	(10,3)		

Select name from customer where sex='M'.

At CSP<sub>1</sub>: Select name from customer where sex='9'.

Select avg(salary) from customer.

At CSP<sub>1</sub>: Select avg(salary) from customer.

### Security analysis and performance evaluation







- > Neither the CSP nor any intruder can decode the original data from only one share.
- > It is very difficult to retrieve shares from all CSPs' by attacking them simultaneously.
- ➢ In the case that an intruder can steal shares from x CSPs such that x ≤ t, the probability of discovering  $b_i$  is very low.



Probability of discovering an original data block from some or all shares



- Data availability: Our schemes guarantee the user can reconstruct D if t or more CSPs are honest and their shares are accessible.
- Data integrity: Our schemes can verify both the honesty of CSPs and the correctness of CSPs' shares.
- Data recovery: If some shares are erroneous (lost, damaged, alternative...), they are reconstructed from t other shares.



Probability of incorrect data not being detected (false negative)



#### The time complexity in both schemes

- > The time complexity of the data sharing process is O(otn)
- > The time complexity of the data reconstruction process is  $O(ot^2)$

**The execution time of Scheme-II**: in the data reconstruction process, the execution time is about 3:04 seconds, and throughput is 336 MB per second when n = 4 and t = 3.



#### Probability of incorrect data not being detected (false negative)



#### The Stored data volume

- > The Stored data volume in Scheme I is indeed lower than on ||P||
- > The Stored data volume in Scheme II is indeed lower than on ||p||

#### For example, with Scheme-II: 32 bits unsigned integers

(It are shared among 6 CSPs and 5 CSPs are sufficient for reconstruct them. Let ||p|| = 9 bits.)

- > The volume of all shares is lower than 1x6x9 = 54 bits.
- > The volume of each share is lower than 1x9 = 9 bits.

#### By implementation of Scheme-II:

- The volume of all shares is greater than the volume of D but less than Dx2.
- The volume of each share is lower than the volume of D.



Volume of shares with Scheme-II





### **Our schemes**



### **Future researches**







